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HOW PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS DIFFER IN THEIR USE
OF NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE
Deborah W. Denno*
INTRODUCTION
Much of the public debate surrounding the intersection of neuroscience
and criminal law is based on assumptions about how prosecutors and defense
attorneys differ in their use of neuroscience evidence. For example,
according to some commentators, the defense’s use of neuroscience evidence
will abdicate criminals of all responsibility for their offenses. In contrast, the
prosecution’s use of that same evidence will unfairly punish the most
vulnerable defendants as unfixable future dangers to society.1 This “doubleedged sword” view of neuroscience evidence is important for flagging
concerns about the law’s construction of criminal responsibility and
punishment: it demonstrates that the same information about the defendant
can either be mitigating or aggravating depending on who is raising it.2 Yet
empirical assessments of legal decisions reveal a far more nuanced reality,
showing that public beliefs about the impact of neuroscience on the criminal
law can often be wrong.3
* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law. I am most grateful to the following individuals for their
contributions to this Article: Jenny Carroll, Marianna Gebhardt, Bruce Green, David Tarras,
Erica Valencia-Graham, Michelle Chipetine, and Tal Finkel. For insightful comments on an
earlier version of this Article, I thank the participants in presentations given at two events: the
Fordham Law Review symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and
Neuroscience Collide (cosponsored with the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law
Center) held at Fordham Law School, and the Eighth Annual CrimFest Conference, held at
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Fordham Law School’s library staff, particularly Alissa
Black-Dorward, provided exceptional research support for this Article, and Benjamin
Chisholm offered wonderful assistance. I am indebted to five sources for research funding:
Fordham Law School, the Proteus Action League, Atlantic Philanthropies, the Gerald
Edelman Fellowship, and the Fordham University Faculty Research Grant. Members of the
Fordham Law Review gave excellent editorial assistance. For an overview of the symposium,
see Deborah W. Denno, Foreword: Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and
Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016).
1. See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study
of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 496–97 (2015).
2. Id. at 496 (“[N]euroscience evidence can be portrayed as a potential ‘double-edged
sword: it may diminish [a defendant’s] blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that
there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.’”).
3. Wide-scale empirical research, recently completed in Canada, England, the
Netherlands, the United States, and Wales, has been particularly effective in revealing
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This Article takes an evidence-based and multidisciplinary approach to
examining how courts respond to neuroscience evidence in capital cases
when the defense presents it to argue that the defendant’s mental state at the
time of the crime was below the given legal requisite due to some neurologic
or cognitive deficiency. A focus on a relatively specific aspect of criminal
doctrine, especially one concerning defendants’ mental states, enables a more
fine-tuned comparison of how the prosecution and defense treat this evidence
and the framework courts use for making decisions. The analysis relies on
data from my “Neuroscience Study,” a unique project evaluating every
criminal case in the United States that has addressed neuroscience evidence
over the course of two decades (1992–2012).4 Neuroscience constitutes “the
branch of the life sciences that studies the brain and nervous system,”5 and it
is not surprising that the role of neuroscience evidence in the justice system
is considered controversial.6 However, an evidence-based approach rests on
the premise that large-scale empirical research studies are among the most
effective ways to combat distorted narratives of how neuroscience fits into
the legal system’s framework.7
Part I of this Article briefly describes my Neuroscience Study, some of the
neuroscience evidence that comes into court, as well as my past findings
concerning the different ways that prosecutors and defense attorneys use
neuroscience evidence. Part II then examines thirty-nine capital cases that
my Neuroscience Study uncovered in which the defense attempted to use
neuroscience evidence to dismiss or diminish the defendant’s level of intent
either at the guilt phase or the penalty phase, along with a corresponding
incorrect beliefs. See generally Paul Catley & Lisa Claydon, The Use of Neuroscientific
Evidence in the Courtroom by Those Accused of Criminal Offenses in England and Wales, 2
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 510 (2015) (researching England and Wales); Jennifer A. Chandler, The
Use of Neuroscientific Evidence in Canadian Criminal Proceedings, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES
550 (2015) (researching Canada); Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent] (researching the
United States); Denno, supra note 1, at 493 (researching the United States); Deborah W.
Denno, The Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 69 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo eds., 2016) (researching
the United States); Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal
Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2016) (researching the United
States); Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence in
the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016) (researching the United States); C.H.
de Kogel & E.J.M.C. Westgeest, Neuroscientific and Behavioral Genetic Information in
Criminal Cases in the Netherlands, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 580 (2015) (researching the
Netherlands).
4. Denno, supra note 1, at 500–04.
5. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE glossary at
206 (Brent Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762
(2014) (defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the
nervous system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”).
6. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy concerning
the double-edged-sword view of neuroscience in the criminal law).
7. Todd R. Clear, Policy and Evidence: The Challenge to the American Society of
Criminology: 2009 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, 48
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (2010) (“It suddenly seems that everyone in the policy-making world, from
professional associations to the White House, has accepted the importance of the evidencebased paradigm.”).
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rebuttal or counterargument from the prosecution.8 My Neuroscience Study
also discovered a comparable number of noncapital cases in which the
defense argued for a lower level mens rea, and this Article’s selection of only
capital cases controls for some of the vast differences between the two
different types of litigation. Regardless, revelations concerning these “lower
mens rea” cases can illuminate why the criminal justice system employs
neuroscience evidence generally, as well as the way it answers some of the
premier questions in the criminal law: How do we assess a defendant’s
mental state based upon the evidence we have before us? How do we really
know what the defendant was intending?
My Neuroscience Study shows that most of these lower mens rea cases
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel claims and therefore have a twopart doctrinal structure for courts to follow concerning the defense counsel’s
level of “deficiency” and the corresponding “prejudice” to the defendant.9
However it is unclear what kind of framework courts are supposed to apply
in deciding when to allow relevant neuroscience evidence to fulfill the
deficiency or prejudice standards in these claims. A substantial number of
courts rely on a double-edged-sword type of analysis of the evidence to
determine which factors are mitigating or aggravating. Yet this approach
often relies on three presumptions: (1) the prosecution can successfully rebut
or nullify whatever neuroscience information the defense presents as
mitigating, (2) the prosecution can turn that same information into
aggravating evidence that can become highly damaging to the defense, and
(3) the prosecution can accurately speculate how positively or negatively a
jury would view such neuroscience evidence as a whole. These unpredictable
and dichotomous presumptions, however, overly simplify and skew the
highly varied nature and purpose of neuroscience evidence, which is hardly
universal.
This Article concludes that the lack of consistency and guidance among
lower mens rea cases seemingly hinders a more effective application of
neuroscience evidence in intent determinations. The real controversy behind
the influx of neuroscience evidence in the criminal justice system is not
whether it will be damaging to defendants, but whether it will be wrongly
cabined when it could be put to good use. Such a direction is more likely if
courts can go beyond the double-edged-sword approach and establish a more
realistic framework. This Article endorses the “reasonable jurist[]”10
framework that one court has introduced and examines how such a criminal
justice actor would view the evidence. The reasonable jurist standard
recognizes the value of case-by-case determinations and the need to refrain
from assumptions about how jurists will view particular types of evidence.
Therefore, a reasonable jurist standard provides courts with a more realistic
lens through which to assess the great range of neuroscience factors.
8. These cases are listed in this Article’s appendix. See infra Appendix.
9. See infra notes 22–33 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine and
composition of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
10. Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part II.C (discussing
the “reasonable jurist” standard).
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An advantage of large-scale empirical research is that it enables
researchers to pinpoint particular questions that would otherwise remain
unanswered due to small sample sizes or other limitations. Questions about
a defendant’s level of intent lie at the heart of criminal law and its system of
punishment. Insight on these issues opens a more productive inquiry as to
how the system currently works, as well as how it should work.
I. NEUROSCIENCE AS A TOOL
FOR THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
This part discusses my Neuroscience Study as a backdrop for
understanding how I selected this Article’s thirty-nine “lesser-intent cases.”11
It also provides an overview of the defense attorney’s obligations and the
prosecutor’s role, both in general terms and, more specifically, how the
defense and the prosecution have applied neuroscience evidence differently
in other types of criminal cases.
A. The Neuroscience Study
The Neuroscience Study consists of all criminal law cases (totaling 800)
that addressed neuroscience evidence from January 1, 1992 to December 31,
2012. The cases were collected employing the Westlaw and LexisNexis legal
databases, which enabled an ongoing examination of more than 100 factors
that are relevant to how the criminal justice system handles such evidence.
A detailed description of the Neuroscience Study’s methodology and
drawbacks—such as using only legal databases—has been provided
elsewhere.12 Nonetheless, the Neuroscience Study offers an opportunity to
examine distributions and trends that has never before been available to
researchers and to question undocumented assumptions about the role of
neuroscience.
The Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases consist of three categories: (1) 514
cases (64.25 percent) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to the
defendant; (2) 247 cases (30.88 percent) concern neuroscience evidence as it
pertains to the victim, primarily to prove the extent of a victim’s brain injury;
and (3) 39 cases (4.88 percent) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains
to both the defendant and the victim—because neuroscience evidence was
relevant to both.13 Neuroscience evidence comprised two groups of tests:
(1) “imaging tests,” which are created by computer images of a human brain,
such as an MRI or CT scan, and (2) “non-imaging tests,” which consist of
measurements provided by a medical professional for determining how an
individual’s brain functions, including intelligence tests and fine-motor
ability tests.14 While many articles on the topic of neuroscience and law

11. See infra Appendix.
12. See generally Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, supra note 3; Denno, supra note 1,
at 500–01.
13. See Denno, supra note 1, at 501.
14. See id. at 500.
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focus on imaging tests,15 both imaging and nonimaging tests are important
for assessing brain dysfunction.16
Overall, the majority of defendants in the Neuroscience Study were
convicted of murder, and most were eligible for the death penalty.17 This
Article analyzes those capital cases in which defense attorneys used
neuroscience evidence to argue that their clients could not have formed the
criminal intent for which they were convicted and punished.
B. The Defense Attorney’s Obligations
In a capital case, attorneys can introduce neuroscience evidence during the
guilt-or-innocence phase, the penalty phase, or both.18 The guilt-orinnocence phase requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of committing the alleged crime.19 If, for
example, an attorney can show that, for any one of a range of reasons, the
defendant did not have the requisite intent for premeditated murder, then the
defendant may be able to avoid a death sentence. During the penalty phase
of a capital case, the jury has already found the defendant guilty of a capital
crime; the question becomes whether the defendant should get the death
penalty or a lesser punishment, typically a life sentence. Such a
determination requires the jury to examine evidence of aggravation from the
prosecution and evidence of mitigation from the defense. In most states, if
the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence, the defendant
can be executed.20 In general, defendants are constitutionally entitled to
introduce neuroscience evidence in the death penalty sentencing phase
because the rules of evidence are more relaxed than in the guilt phase.21
The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that an attorney’s performance
should be assessed by “prevailing professional norms.”22 For capital cases,
this mandate requires a “thorough investigation”23 of “all reasonably
available mitigating evidence”24 pertaining to a defendant’s relevant
15. See generally JONES ET AL., supra note 5 (covering a broad range of topics regarding
the connection between neuroscience and law, many of which involve a discussion of brain
imaging).
16. See Denno, supra note 1, at 505 (noting that defendant cases rely on both imaging and
nonimaging tests).
17. See id. at 501–02.
18. See John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense’s Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases—
Lessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L. REV. 909, 914 (2011).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 914–15.
21. See Jane Campbell Moriarty et al., Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic
Complexity, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 702, 712–13 (2013) (noting that in penalty phase hearings,
where the rules of evidence generally do not apply, certain brain scans frequently have been
admitted).
22. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
23. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 396 (2000)).
24. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 11.4.1(C)
(1989)).
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background,25 especially evidence that has the greatest influence on
mitigation, such as a defendant’s cognitive or intellectual deficiencies.26
Attorneys who fail to conduct proper investigations are less equipped to
engage in a reasonable strategic decision about whether to introduce evidence
that could help a defendant.27 These attorneys also are more susceptible to
defendants’ appeals claiming prejudicially deficient counsel in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, known as an “ineffective assistance of counsel” or a
Strickland claim.28
In Strickland v. Washington,29 the Court set forth a two-part test to assess
the validity of ineffective assistance of counsel challenges, noting first that a
counsel’s performance must actually be “deficient” and second that this
deficient performance must have “prejudiced” the defendant.30 Proof of
prejudice is challenging: not only must legal counsel be substantially
inadequate, but such inadequacy must also constitute the “but-for” cause of
the defendant’s conviction.31
Defendants can bring Strickland claims for a wide range of reasons, and
they often bring many in one case. Yet, the Neuroscience Study showed that
Strickland claims are particularly important when it comes to neuroscience
evidence: nearly all of the successful Strickland claims recorded among the
Neuroscience Study’s 553 defendant cases were based on an attorney’s
failure to appropriately investigate, gather, or understand neuroscience
evidence.32 In general, courts presume attorneys will present relevant
neuroscience evidence on behalf of their clients, and they are likely to render
attorneys ineffective when they fail to do so.33
Courts’ concerns about the introduction of neuroscience evidence in court
appear well justified. For example, in the Neuroscience Study, defendantpetitioners who were able to satisfy the Strickland requirements were often
“afforded relief in the form of a new penalty phase, reversal of their
conviction for a new trial, or a remand with instructions to hold a new
evidentiary hearing.”34 In addition, the Neuroscience Study has shown that
25. Porter, 558 U.S. at 39.
26. This evidence is varied and wide ranging. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946
(2010) (discussing frontal lobe damage); Porter, 558 U.S. at 36 (discussing brain damage and
cognitive defects in reading, writing, and memory); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392
(2005) (discussing organic brain damage and significant cognitive impairments); Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (discussing impaired intellectual functioning); Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 535 (discussing diminished mental capacities); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (discussing
borderline mental retardation).
27. See Sears, 561 U.S. at 954 (“We rejected any suggestion that a decision to focus on
one potentially reasonable trial strategy . . . [can be] ‘justified by a tactical decision’ when
‘counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s
background.’” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396)).
28. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984) (establishing and
discussing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
29. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Id. at 687.
31. See id. at 694.
32. Denno, supra note 1, at 507.
33. See id. at 499, 505–25.
34. Id. at 506–07.
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courts regularly accept neuroscience evidence to mitigate punishments in the
way that traditional criminal law has always allowed and for well-established
legal purposes—to provide fact-finders with more complete and reliable
information when determining a defendant’s sentence.35
Using neuroscience evidence in capital sentencing, however, introduces a
double-edged-sword problem, namely that the defendant’s brain is
considered “too broken” and the defendant “too dangerous to have at large,”
even if he is “somehow less culpable.”36 Yet the Neuroscience Study’s
findings indicate that neuroscience evidence is introduced into court nearly
exclusively by defense attorneys as a vehicle to eliminate or mitigate their
clients’ punishments. This is especially apparent when the evidence is
applied to death penalty cases.
C. The Prosecutor’s Role
During the penalty phase of a capital trial, the majority of death penalty
states take into account, as an aggravating factor, a defendant’s potential for
future dangerousness.37 The issue of future dangerousness has become
especially significant in the last decade because of concerns that prosecutors
will use neuroscience evidence as an aggravating factor indicating a
defendant’s future proclivity to commit additional crimes.38
Yet the Neuroscience Study found less support than previously speculated
about concerns involving the prosecutor’s use of the evidence. Only very
rarely is neuroscience evidence employed by prosecutors in rebuttal to
suggest that defendants will engage in future dangerous behavior and
therefore deserve more punishment.39 I reported a similar result when I
investigated every criminal case in the United States that addressed
behavioral genetics evidence over the course of seventeen years (1994–
2011).40 While prosecutors and defense attorneys do use neuroscience
35. See id. at 504; see also James S. Walker & William Bernet, Neuroscience and Legal
Proceedings, in THE ORIGINS OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
245–49 (Christopher R. Thomas & Kayla Pope eds., 2012) (discussing how neuroscience
evidence connects to behavior); Adam Lamparello, Neuroscience, Brain Damage, and the
Criminal Defendant: Who Does It Help and Where in the Criminal Proceeding Is It Most
Relevant?, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 161, 178 (2012) (noting that “brain injuries such as frontal
lobe disorder” can also be “substantially relevant and probative[] [b]ecause . . . the effects that
accompany an injury to the frontal lobe” can make the defendant less culpable).
36. See Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in
INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349, 362 (T.M. Spranger ed., 2012).
37. See Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital
Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 64–65 (2005).
38. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1318–38 (2008) (discussing and critiquing then-current and aspirational
uses of neuroscience in capital cases).
39. See Denno, supra note 1, at 527.
40. See Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics
Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967,
1027–28 [hereinafter Denno, Courts’ Increasing]. This investigation of behavioral genetics
evidence was conducted over time by way of three of this author’s studies. See id.; see also
Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1994–2007, in THE
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evidence differently from behavioral genetics evidence, prosecutors
generally do not apply either type of evidence to suggest that a defendant will
be a danger in the future. In the few cases in which prosecutors applied
neuroscience evidence to suggest a defendant’s future dangerousness, that
tactic was based primarily upon using the evidence first introduced by a
defense expert under circumstances in which the defense was not properly
prepared.41 For example, among the Neuroscience Study’s 553 defendant
cases, only 10 cases—all of which were capital murder cases—involved
prosecutors successfully using such evidence.42 Thus, the Neuroscience
Study’s findings suggest that, overall, there is little likelihood (at least at the
present time) that neuroscience evidence introduced by the defense will be
leveraged by the prosecution in an effort to prove the defendant’s future
dangerousness.
If prosecutors generally refrain from rebutting defense evidence by
suggesting that defendants will be a future danger, do they engage in any
efforts to introduce neuroscience on their own? The Neuroscience Study
showed that they do but nearly exclusively for the one-third of the
Neuroscience Study’s cases (286 cases in total) that consider relevant
neuroscience evidence from victims.43 In other words, prosecutors (not
defense attorneys) were nearly exclusively responsible for introducing the
neuroscience evidence (most typically brain scans) into court for these
victim-evidence cases. The Neuroscience Study also revealed that nearly
half of these cases were based on medical expert testimony that the victims
suffered from shaken baby syndrome, a medical diagnosis with controversial
scientific underpinnings and potentially distorted legal ramifications.44 The
diagnosis often successfully serves as the sole foundation for a prosecutor’s
case; there is commonly no proof of the defendant’s act or intent, except for
the victim’s brain scan and the accompanying medical expert testimony,
because so little circumstantial evidence is available.45
Shaken baby syndrome cases thus portray a troubling phenomenon in
which the key element of mens rea is either unclear or overlooked altogether,
and prosecutors are permitted to concoct intent out of brain scans that were
admitted for the sole purpose of presenting the victim’s injury. The
Neuroscience Study further revealed that shaken baby syndrome cases
represent a microcosm of prosecutorial misuse of victim neuroscience

IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 317 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009);
Deborah W. Denno, Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. SOC’Y 209 (2006).
41. See Denno, supra note 1, at 526–43.
42. See id. at 527–28.
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The 247 cases pertaining to the victim as
well as the 39 cases pertaining to both the victim and the defendant total to 286 cases that
provide information on the victim (irrespective of whether 39 of those cases also provide
information on the defendant).
44. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, supra note 3.
45. See id.
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evidence more generally, particularly when determining a defendant’s mental
state.46
Further differences between how the defense and the prosecution approach
the application of neuroscience evidence in the courtroom are discussed in
more detail elsewhere.47 The key point is that the evidence can be quite a
boon for prosecutors, who decide to introduce it for the purposes of assessing
a victim’s injury, especially a very young victim.48 The following part offers
a more targeted context for comparing how prosecutors and defense attorneys
differ in their use of neuroscience evidence, with a focus on the defendant’s
level of intent. This lens provides a fuller understanding of how courts
consider these arguments and evidence.
II. NEUROSCIENCE AND DEFENDANTS’ MENS REA
This part takes an unprecedented look at the Neuroscience Study’s capital
cases in which neuroscience evidence was introduced to argue that
defendants did not have the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes for which
they were convicted. Essentially, defendants who commit capital crimes
present neuroscience evidence to establish that their mental state at the time
of the crime was below the given legal requirement (a lower mens rea) due
to neurologic or cognitive deficiency. This part’s discussion analyzes courts’
failure to provide guidelines for evaluating such evidence, often shoehorning
aggravating and mitigating circumstances into lump categories (either
directly or indirectly) under a double-edged-sword dichotomy without
explanation or support.
In the Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases,49 there are 81 cases (10.13 percent)
in which the defense argued that the defendant did not have the necessary
level of mens rea: 39 of these cases involved capital offenses and 42 involved
noncapital offenses.50 This part focuses only on the capital cases so that there
is consistency among the legal issues the courts consider, especially given
the diverse array of evidence and defendants. This Article’s appendix lists
the capital cases and a brief description of each to provide a sense of the
disparate nature of the cases, even though they all involve the guilt and
penalty phases of death penalty trials.51

46. See id.
47. See generally Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, supra note 3 (focusing on the
prosecution’s use of neuroscience evidence); Denno, supra note 1 (focusing on the defense’s
use of neuroscience evidence).
48. For an excellent article on changing assumptions about prosecutorial ethics and
misbehavior, see Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. See Deborah W. Denno, The Neuroscience Study’s Eighty-One Cases in Which the
Defense Argued that the Defendant Did Not Have the Necessary Level of Mens Rea (January
2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (highlighting the thirty-nine capital cases in
yellow and the forty-two noncapital cases in green).
51. See infra Appendix.
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A. The Mens Rea Cases
The defense was successful, either in whole or in part, in ten cases, or onequarter (25.64 percent) of the thirty-nine lower mens rea cases.52 Success
was measured, for example, by the defense’s win of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel or the court’s dropping of a conviction or sentence for
at least one crime.53
Not surprisingly, more than three-quarters of the cases overall (thirty-one
cases or 79.49 percent) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel claims.54
All but two of the successful cases55 were part of the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, meaning that over one-quarter (25.81 percent) of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were successful.56 Compared to
nationwide statistics on successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim
cases—which average 5 percent or less in the capital arena57—cases
involving claims of the nonuse or misuse of neuroscience evidence fare
substantially better. Provisionally, then, this group of cases appears to be
stronger for the defense than other types of ineffective assistance of counsel
cases.58
The neuroscience evidence bolsters a range of claims concerning why a
defendant would not be capable of the level of mens rea required for a
particular offense. In broad categories, defense strategies raise arguments
that the defendant had evidence of “mental retardation” (that is, intellectual
disability), intoxication (either at the time of the crime, over time, or both),
diminished capacity, an inability to premeditate or deliberate and to form
intent, brain abnormality, an inability to appreciate wrongfulness or the
criminality of conduct, life stressors, and poor impulse control.59 These
52. See infra Appendix. The successful cases are identified by a ⨹ in the appendix. Take
note that some of these cases may be ongoing and what may be viewed as a success at the time
of this Article’s publication may change in time given the likelihood of future appeals. For
further explication and documentation of these cases, see Deborah W. Denno, Lower Mens
Rea Capital Cases (June 1, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
53. See Denno, supra note 52.
54. See infra Appendix. The ineffective assistance of counsel cases are identified by a ⧆
in the appendix. In many cases, it is not clear whether the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims occur at the guilt phase or the penalty phase, although in theory they could occur in
both phases. See Denno, supra note 52.
55. These two cases were United States v. Davis, 611 F. Supp. 2d 472 (D. Md. 2009), and
People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997). See infra Appendix.
56. This statistic was derived by dividing the eight successful cases by the thirty-one cases
involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which equals 25.81 percent.
57. See Kenneth Williams, Does Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?,
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1459, 1472–79 (2009) (discussing a survey of decisions by those circuits
that were the most active in the death penalty and finding that the percentage of successful
ineffective of assistance of counsel claims cases was generally less than 5 percent after
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), except for the Ninth Circuit, in which wins were
slightly over 50 percent).
58. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims involving neuroscience evidence generally were substantially more successful than
claims that did not involve neuroscience evidence).
59. See infra Appendix. These categories of claims are identified respectively by numbers
①–⑧ in the Appendix. For further discussion and documentation, see Denno, supra note
52. In 2010, Congress passed Rosa’s Law, which required that all federal laws replace any
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categories are not mutually exclusive but rather can occur simultaneously in
the same case.
All of these arguments and claims rely on a wide range of neuroscience
evidence and include both imaging and nonimaging tests.60 The challenge is
that courts lack sufficient guidance concerning the use of neuroscience, even
under the framework of Strickland. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has
made clear that neuroscience evidence is an important component of
responsible lawyering for capital cases.61 On the other hand, courts seem illequipped to interpret such evidence, while the prosecution and defense
present very different perspectives.
B. The Troubling Power of the Double-Edged Sword
This section examines several cases that most thoroughly exemplify the
use of neuroscience evidence to demonstrate a lower mens rea and how courts
have responded to the presentation of such evidence. With death penalty
cases, litigation becomes complex as standards and outcomes change over
the years, especially in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. The doubleedged-sword framework is particularly pronounced, either directly or
indirectly.
1. Speculative Distinctions Among Types of Evidence
Within the group of thirty-nine Neuroscience Study cases, Evans v.
Secretary, Department of Corrections62 serves as an appropriate paradigm
for laying out the key contours of the double-edged-sword arguments and,
therefore, the different strategies of the prosecution and defense. In Evans,
the defendant, Wydell Evans, shot and killed his brother’s girlfriend while
they argued about her purported infidelity involving Evans’s brother.63
Evans was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to death,
after which a series of appeals led him to contend that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately investigate a substantial array of mental
health mitigation information to present at the penalty phase.64 This
information included evidence of Evans’s troubled childhood—school and
medical records showed that he was hit by a car and diagnosed with a closed

mention of the term “mental retardation” with the term “intellectual disability,” in light of the
movement by mental health organizations and scholars to shift the terminology in the area.
Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20, 29, 42 U.S.C.). This Article continues to use the term “mental retardation,”
however, to be consistent with the references made in legal practice and in court cases, which
have not yet fully adopted this terminological transition.
60. See infra Appendix. For further discussion and documentation, see Denno, supra note
52.
61. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (discussing some of the major Supreme
Court cases).
62. 681 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.), vacated on reh’g en banc, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012),
trial court opinion aff’d on reh’g en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); see infra Appendix.
63. Evans, 681 F.3d at 1244.
64. Id. at 1250.
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head injury, which also impaired his speech and language abilities.65
Additional school records indicated that Evans had severe learning
disabilities and behavioral problems, which escalated from anger and
aggression to violence and poor impulse control toward others.66
At Evans’s evidentiary hearing, three mental health experts confirmed that
Evans “had brain damage attributable to his head injury” that was
demonstrated by IQ test-score differences and his learning disabilities.67
Two of the experts also suggested that Evans “suffered from an
uncontrollable rage reaction or impulse disorder as a result of the brain
damage” and that, at the time Evans shot his victim, he was overtaken by
rage, which his drinking fueled further.68
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Evans that his trial counsel was deficient
and that this deprived Evans of the opportunity to have jury instructions
issued on two mental health statutory mitigators.69 The court also
distinguished among the different types of evidence presented and explained
the importance of evaluating certain deficiencies according to their degree
and time of occurrence.70 For example, the court noted “that evidence of
Evans’s teenage alcohol abuse and violence may have been a double edged
sword, though only at a certain chronological point,”71 thereby suggesting
that the sway of such evidence was particularly critical at certain stages in a
person’s development. Yet the court could not “agree that Evans’s
closedhead injury at the age of three, resulting brain damage, and academic
and behavioral difficulties in school are more harmful than helpful, as the
state courts concluded.”72 As the Eleventh Circuit emphasized, “[j]ust the
opposite is true.”73 Indeed, the court stressed that “undisputed brain damage
resulting from a traumatic brain injury is inherently mitigating,”74 thereby
putting brain injury in a category of per se mitigating evidence. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong to find
Evans’s postconviction evidence to be irrelevant in a Strickland claim75: had
the jury heard it, “there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned
with a different sentence.”76
In a rehearing en banc, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its prior
decision,77 holding instead that the state court’s finding that Evans failed to
establish prejudice was a reasonable application of Strickland.78 Once again,
the court used the double-edged-sword analysis, explaining that Evans failed
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1246–47.
Id. at 1247 (quoting Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 2006)).
Id. (quoting Evans, 946 So. 2d at 8).
Id. at 1261–62.
Id. at 1268–70.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003)).
Evans, 686 F.3d 1321.
Id. at 1328.
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to show prejudice under Strickland “because the mitigation evidence was a
‘double-edged sword,’ that ‘would likely have been more harmful than
helpful.’”79 The en banc court relied on recent Supreme Court decisions,
which established that prejudice could not be shown if the evidence either
was not “clearly mitigating” or would have “opened the door to powerful
rebuttal evidence.”80 Likewise, the court noted that Eleventh Circuit
precedent also would “hold that it is reasonable to treat the kind of evidence
that Evans presented in his postconviction hearing as ‘a “two-edged
sword,”’” noting, for example, “that evidence of an ‘antisocial personality
disorder [or] narcissistic personality disorder . . . [is] more harmful . . . than
mitigating.’”81 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida reasonably concluded
that Evans’s new mental health theory of mitigation “would have opened the
door to damaging evidence.”82
The Supreme Court of Florida’s emphasis on a double-edged-sword
analysis, while shared by other cases, is inadequate and speculative in several
respects. First, as Evans rightly noted, “the Supreme Court of Florida failed
to say enough and instead ‘assumed the evidence was more harmful than
helpful.’”83 Evans’s call for a more thorough response seems basic enough
given the broad diversity of evidence that he provided and the court’s
approach of treating it all the same and with little explanation. Attorneys are
expected to present mitigation evidence, but they are given very little
guidance on how to do so. If some evidence will be viewed as possibly more
harmful than helpful, then it makes sense that a court would draw some
distinctions. However, the Eleventh Circuit missed the point that Evans was
trying to make. Instead, it suggested that Evans’s request for clarity “smacks
of a ‘grading papers’ approach”84 that would have federal habeas courts
judge the quality of the state courts’ reasoning and thus put them in a tutelary
position.85 Yet, Evans is not introducing a tutelary role for the federal courts.
Rather, he seems to be asking only that the Supreme Court of Florida take on
a tutelary position for attorneys so that they would know which, and when,
evidence is most mitigating.
Before its en banc decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit did start to draw
distinctions among the different types of mitigating evidence, although it did
not cite to support. For example, Evans’s drinking and violence as a teen
could have been considered a double-edged sword up to a certain age,86 while
79. Evans, 703 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 2006)).
80. Id. (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011)).
81. Id. at 1328 (alterations in original) (first quoting Suggs v. McNeil, 609 F.3d 1218,
1231 (11th Cir. 2010); then quoting Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1248
(11th Cir. 2010)).
82. Id. at 1332–33 (quoting Cummings v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331,
1367 (11th Cir. 2009)).
83. Id. at 1329 (quoting Evans, 946 So. 2d at 13).
84. Id. (quoting Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.
2002)).
85. Id. at 1329–30.
86. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir.), vacated on reh’g en
banc, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012), trial court opinion aff’d on reh’g en banc, 703 F.3d
1316.
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“Evans’s closedhead injury at the age of three, resulting brain damage, and
academic and behavioral difficulties in school” would be considered
mitigating.87 While “undisputed brain damage resulting from a traumatic
brain injury is inherently mitigating”88 in the eyes of the Eleventh Circuit
judges who initially heard Evans’s petition, the en banc court noted “that
evidence of an ‘antisocial personality disorder [or] narcissistic personality
disorder . . . [is] more harmful . . . than mitigating.’”89
Whether these are the kinds of detailed explanations Evans was seeking,
the Eleventh Circuit is at least trying to provide some justification for its
decision. The court’s confidence seems deceptively appealing as a type of
framework for analyzing evidence until it becomes clear that the court offers
no guidance for attorneys to work within that framework.
2. When Aggravators Become Mitigators
The Evans Court’s response also does not consider the additional kinds of
evidentiary complexities involved in the other lesser mens rea decisions
assessing neuroscience. For example, in Commonwealth v. Johnson90 the
situation reverses: the defendant, who is convicted of deliberately
premeditated murder, contended that the neuroscience evidence his trial
attorney introduced was a potentially double-edged sword (or at least the
defendant viewed the evidence as possibly being interpreted as aggravating
instead of mitigating).91
According to appellate counsel, for example, it was wrong for trial counsel
to characterize the defendant in his opening statement as someone who is
“antisocial . . . [with] impulsive action or reaction to almost little or no
provocation, and also typified by a lack of remorse, misconduct.”92 Yet trial
counsel claimed that, not only were these the words that the testifying expert
used, but also his “strategy was to convince the jury that the defendant could
not premeditate, that he was compelled by intoxication and other forces in
his personality to perpetrate a horrific crime based on a total absence of
reason.”93 The Johnson Court determined that trial counsel’s strategy was
“justified” because it was fueled by counsel’s desire to argue the defendant’s
lower level of intent to avoid a first-degree murder verdict.94 In addition,
trial counsel’s approach “was not ‘tantamount to an admission of his client’s
guilt’ or an ‘abdicat[ion of] his client’s position.’”95
Johnson therefore is more of a case about how presented evidence is
handled, rather than a failure to present neuroscience evidence altogether.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Evans, 703 F.3d at 1328 (alterations in original) (quoting Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1248 (11th Cir. 2010)).
90. 754 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 2001); see infra Appendix.
91. Johnson, 754 N.E.2d at 698.
92. Id. at 699 (alterations in original).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Triplett, 500 N.E.2d 262, 267 (Mass. 1986)).
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Here, the court’s discussion of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim
makes relative sense. All the evidence that defense counsel introduced was
already presented by the experts, so the jury was exposed to this evidence as
well. Also, the court recognized that defense counsel was applying this
evidence to convince the jury that the defendant could not premeditate, thus
supporting a lesser-intent argument. While the strategy was not successful,
it could be considered reasonable (even though some attorneys may view it
as risky). The case also illustrates that the distinction between “aggravating”
and “mitigating” often depends on context and the goals that the defense is
trying to achieve.
C. The Draw of the “Reasonable Jurists” Standard
These differing perspectives on what constitutes mitigating or aggravating
evidence suggest that the double-edged-sword framework is simplistic and,
at times, misleading. Smith v. Dretke,96 however, offers a thorough
Strickland analysis in which the court, when compared to the Evans Court,
appears far more cautious and reluctant to speculate on how jurists would
regard evidence.97 The court also seems to advocate using a “reasonable
jurist” standard and a reference to professional norms when discussing the
adequacy of trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigating
evidence.98 While the prosecution argued that the neuroscience evidence
could have been a double-edged sword if defense counsel presented it,99 the
court disagreed, finding that this neuroscience evidence should have been
introduced because reasonable jurists could be convinced that it made the
defendant less culpable.100
Smith, who was convicted of capital murder, contended that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate mitigation evidence
pertaining to his cocaine and alcohol intoxication, his background and
upbringing, and his prior disciplinary record from prison.101 According to
the prosecution, however, trial counsel’s decision to forgo introducing a
“psychiatric professional” to testify about Smith’s substance abuse was a
reasonable strategic decision because of the prosecution’s assessment that the
evidence “could easily be a ‘double edged sword.’”102
In response, the court noted that “reasonable jurists could conclude that the
district court’s assessment of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
debatable or wrong.”103 Citing Supreme Court precedent, if the trial court
did in fact conduct some sort of investigation, the issue would be its adequacy
in light of professional norms.104 Smith’s counsel, however, falsely claimed,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

422 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005); see infra Appendix.
See supra Part II.B.
Smith, 422 F.3d at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 278–80 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)).
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among other things, that she engaged in extensive interviews with some
family members and that her explanations for why she presented certain
testimony conflicted with the testimony that was actually introduced into
court.105 “Reasonable jurists” could also consider whether trial counsel’s
decision to forgo investigating “the psychological and biological impact of
Smith’s substance abuse” comported with professional standards.106 As the
court explained, “In light of the scant mitigation evidence presented,
reasonable jurists could debate whether the evidence Smith now proffers
would have convinced a juror that Smith was less morally culpable such that
life imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, was appropriate.”107 The
court determined that reasonable jurists could in fact conclude that the district
court wrongly denied Smith’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.108
In essence, then, Smith—unlike Evans—exemplifies a court that does not
seem as quick to make assumptions about the jury’s probable determinations
in a given scenario. The court steers away from speculation, choosing instead
to stress that reasonable jurists could debate this matter. In addition, the court
discusses the adequacy of the defense’s trial investigation in relation to the
“professional norms” discussed in Supreme Court precedent.109 The court
attempts to give this type of discussion some sort of framework, not
necessarily as to the weight given to any specific piece of evidence but,
rather, as to the amount of evidence that should be presented given what
information is available.
1. Problematic Double-Edged-Sword Approaches
In contrast to Smith, other cases, such as Nobles v. Johnson,110 appear
forced and formulaic in their efforts to take on a double-edged-sword
approach. In Nobles, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance because, had the jury heard evidence of defendant’s
mental impairment from drugs and alcohol, it could have concluded that he
had not deliberately committed the murders for which he was convicted.111
Yet, the court’s determination was that the evidence was not sufficiently
strong, helpful, or convincing in light of Nobles’s questionable claims of
memory loss.112 By finding that trial counsel’s omission of Nobles’s
evidence was not prejudicial, the court seemingly concluded that the
evidence would have been inconsequential.113 Regardless, the court
determined that the effect of the evidence still could have been harmful.114
“The so-called ‘mitigating’ psychological evidence Nobles refers to was at
105. Id. at 281–82.
106. Id. at 283.
107. Id. at 284.
108. Id. at 278.
109. Id. at 279–80 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522–23 and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374 (2005)).
110. 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997).
111. Id. at 418.
112. Id. at 419.
113. Id. at 422.
114. See id.
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best double-edged: not to present evidence of Nobles’s volatile mental state,
especially given counsel’s decision to emphasize Nobles’s non-violent
Essentially, the
history, was clearly reasonable trial strategy.”115
prosecution’s focus on the double-edged aspect of the evidence of Nobles’s
volatile mental state helped to convince the court that counsel’s trial strategy
was reasonable.
Pike v. State116 is another case where the defense counsel argued against
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, stressing that certain information
was double-edged in nature.117 However, Pike is also noteworthy because it
provides a three-pronged analysis based on counsel’s failure to present
mitigating evidence.118 This approach appears to be the Pike Court’s attempt
to provide a framework for detecting and weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors.
Christa Pike was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder and
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder after testimony indicated that she
had brutally tortured the victim, leading the jury to find two statutory
aggravating circumstances.119 Pike claimed ineffective assistance of counsel
due to her counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence that was already
available and to uncover additional evidence.120 Specifically, counsel chose
not to present defendant’s social history evidence either through lay
witnesses or through expert testimony from the forensic psychologist who
had examined Pike, claiming that the psychologist’s materials in particular
contained double-edged information.121 Yet, the Pike Court found such a
rationale unjustifiable. Not only should trial counsel have known about the
double-edged material as a result of communications with the psychologist,
but also “the negative information could have been presented in a way to
strengthen the mental illness diagnosis,” especially since the prosecution
eventually obtained the information regardless.122
The Tennessee Supreme Court established a three-step framework for
courts to follow in assessing the viability of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to present mitigating
evidence123:
(1) the reviewing court must first analyze the nature and extent of the
mitigating evidence that was available and not presented; (2) the court must
then determine whether substantially similar mitigating evidence was
presented to the jury during either the guilt phase or the sentencing phase
of the proceedings; and (3) the court must consider whether there was such
115. Id.
116. No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25,
2011); see infra Appendix.
117. Pike, 2011 WL 1544207, at *50.
118. Id. (citing the three-prong approach and Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Tenn.
1996)).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. at *49.
121. Id. at *50.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 371).
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strong evidence of applicable aggravating factors that the mitigating
evidence would not have affected the jury’s determination.124

The Pike Court determined that Pike had satisfied none of the three factors.
First, while the forensic psychologist testified that there was a range of
mitigation evidence that she thought could have been presented to the jury,
counsel concluded it was best to limit some of the mitigation in an effort to
control the negative aspects of it.125 In addition, the court found that some
of the information in the psychologist’s report was “substantially similar” to
that provided during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial.126 Lastly,
the court also concluded that the aggravating factors so clearly outweighed
the mitigating factors that the mitigation evidence would not have affected
the jury regardless.127 Therefore, Pike could not successfully establish that
there was prejudice.128
The Pike case is noteworthy for two reasons: (1) the court offers a threepart test to provide a framework for discussing the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel, as well as the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
factors, and (2) the court accepts defense counsel’s argument that the forensic
psychologist’s materials presented double-edged information. While there
may have been mitigating evidence that was not presented to the jury, the
court had previously granted counsel’s decision to limit at least some of that
evidence in an effort to contain the negative aspects of it. At the same time,
the Pike framework is not substantially different from a double-edged
approach; it simply gives the court a more structured way of asking the
questions, but the double-edged perspective remains.
2. Determining What Is “Reasonable”
The Smith “reasonable jurists” standard provides a framework for
examining lower mens rea cases without being caught inside the doubleedged-sword box. Of course, there are many decisions to be made about what
a jurist could consider “reasonable” based upon issues raised by some of the
Neuroscience Study’s cases. For example, the Evans Court stressed that
“undisputed brain damage resulting from a traumatic brain injury is
inherently mitigating.”129 This circumstance seems to characterize the
defendant in Odle v. Calderon.130 He had experienced a lobectomy, after
which he “was missing a piece of his brain the size of a grapefruit,”131
causing a varying array of mental deficiencies and behavioral problems

124. Id.
125. Id. at *51.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *52.
129. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir.), vacated on reh’g en
banc, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012), trial court opinion aff’d on reh’g en banc, 703 F.3d
1316 (2013).
130. 919 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Odle v. Woodford,
238 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra Appendix.
131. Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089.
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immediately after his trauma occurred. A reasonable jurist would likely view
this information as critical to a mitigation analysis, but any determination
under a Smith standard would not be as definitive as the standard the court
suggests in Evans.
There are other questions. What is the appropriate scientific standard for
mitigation? Depending on the issue being raised, some courts appear more
willing to rely on so-called “objective tests,” rather than an expert’s
testimony interpreting test results. In Clayton v. Roper,132 the Eighth Circuit
determined that the trial court did not err in finding the defendant competent,
given that “the court placed more emphasis on the objective findings from
the tests the [expert] doctor performed than on [the expert’s] ultimate
conclusion.”133 Likewise, the court favored test results over the defense’s
testimony from a neurologist and clinical psychologist. Those two experts
stated that, as a result of the defendant losing about 8 percent of his brain
tissue in a prior sawmill accident, coupled with his frequent alcohol use,
defendant’s ability to form intent was compromised.134 Yet, how does a
court distinguish between an “objective” test and expert testimony? In what
way is a test’s findings separate from an expert’s interpretation of the results?
Would the court simply want the expert to testify, for example, that the
defendant lost 8 percent of his brain tissue, and then leave it to the judge or
jury to determine whether that loss would compromise a defendant’s ability
to form intent? In United States v. Battle,135 during its competency
determination, the court noted that objectively graded personality tests
conducted by experts for both sides suggested that the defendant did not
suffer from a thought disorder of psychotic proportions.136 A court may
believe that a focus on objective tests may eliminate some ambiguity or
guesswork from decision making, but such an approach also discards an
important part of a criminal trial involving neuroscience evidence—expert
testimony.
Additional considerations exist beyond the kinds of standards courts may
use in assessing neuroscience evidence in lower mens rea determinations.
For example, it is still unclear what long-term effect Cullen v. Pinholster,137
and related cases, will have. Cullen is the Supreme Court’s decision
restricting prisoners’ attempts to acquire federal habeas relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966.138 The case is in the
Neuroscience Study’s database because the defendant was plagued by a vast
range of mental, personality, and behavioral disorders, and the Court used the
opportunity to impose limits on capital defendants generally.139 Regardless,
neuroscience evidence is now so pronounced throughout the criminal justice

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

515 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2008); see infra Appendix.
Clayton, 515 F.3d at 791.
Id. at 787–88.
272 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2003); see infra Appendix.
See Battle, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
563 U.S. 170 (2011); see infra Appendix.
Cullen, 563 U.S. at 174.
For a discussion of Cullen, see Denno, Courts’ Increasing, supra note 40, at 1021–27.
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system that, while a case like Cullen may control its reach, the evidence is
here to stay. The key question that remains is how we will deal with it.
CONCLUSION
The double-edged-sword framework is a common component of capital
cases involving both aggravating and mitigating evidence. Yet, what
constitutes aggravating as opposed to mitigating evidence is often in flux, a
circumstance that can cause confusion and potential manipulation by
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike, especially in cases involving
neuroscience. By identifying and analyzing criminal cases in which defense
attorneys contend that their clients did not possess the requisite level of
intent, this Article attempts to expand the legal system’s opportunities to use
neuroscience evidence in reliable and valid ways. The guiding standards for
doing so are critically important, however, and they must accommodate the
nature of the litigation process and the actors involved in it. Increasingly,
those standards must also welcome, when appropriate, the contributions of
modern science in helping the system decipher one of society’s great
mysteries—how people think and how the legal system can better address the
actions that result from those thoughts.
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APPENDIX
THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY: CAPITAL CASES IN WHICH NEUROSCIENCE
EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO ARGUE THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
HAVE THE REQUISITE MENS REA
⧆ Cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
⨹ Cases in which the defense was successful
Cases in which the defendant had evidence of one or more key factors:
① mental retardation (intellectual disability)140
② intoxication (involving either drugs or alcohol)
③ diminished capacity
④ an inability to premeditate and/or to form intent (typically for firstdegree murder charges)
⑤ brain abnormality
⑥ an inability to appreciate wrongfulness or criminality of conduct
⑦ life stressors, including evidence of child abuse
⑧ poor impulse control
1. Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (discussing
the State’s rebuttal evidence that, despite the brain injuries that resulted from
the defendant being shot in the head twice, he was nevertheless deemed
competent to stand trial and did not suffer from delusions or from a mental
disease or defect).
⧆①⑥⑦
2. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that defense
counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of trial for failing to present
sufficient psychiatric evidence that defendant suffered from mental
retardation, posttraumatic stress disorder, brain damage, and habitual drug
use in support of a diminished capacity defense).
⧆⨹①②③④
3. Blanco v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 688 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012)
(finding that although the psychiatrist appointed by the trial court to assist
petitioner in presenting mitigating evidence was unpersuasive, he was still
effective in that the psychiatrist’s preparation included a one-hour mental
health evaluation of the defendant and review of records provided by other
experts).
⑥
4. Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009) (upholding the proportionality
of the defendant’s death sentence based on the testimony of two defense
expert witnesses who opined that, while the defendant’s substance abuse
problem aggravated his preexisting sexual obsessive disorder, substantially
140. See supra note 59 (discussing courts’ usage of the term “mental retardation” rather
than “intellectual disability”).
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impairing his ability to refrain from committing rape, he did not have any
similar corresponding mental disorder that would have caused a similar type
of impairment in his ability to refrain from committing murder).
②③⑤
5. Clayton v. Roper, 515 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the trial
court did not err in finding the defendant competent based on the results of
the objective psychiatrist tests, rather than on the defense’s testimony from a
neurologist and clinical psychologist that, as a result of the defendant losing
about 8 percent of his brain tissue in a prior accident, coupled with his
frequent alcohol use, defendant’s ability to form intent was compromised).
④⑤
6. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 754 N.E.2d 685, 699 (Mass. 2001)
(discussing the defense counsel’s strategy to obtain a verdict less than firstdegree murder by convincing “the jury that the defendant could not
premeditate, that he was compelled by intoxication and other forces in his
personality to perpetrate a horrific crime based on a total absence of reason”).
⧆⨹②④
7. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 810 A.2d 1211, 1221 (Pa. 2002) (rejecting
the defendant’s claims of diminished capacity or mental impairment because
the defense counsel found no signs of major mental illness, organic brain
disease, or other malady, and finding the evidence of the defendant’s
voluntary intoxication insufficient to reduce his first-degree murder
conviction as it failed to show that the defendant was so “overwhelmed or
overpowered by [drugs] to the point of losing his faculties or sensibilities” at
the time he murdered his wife and daughter (quoting Commonwealth v.
Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. 1991))).
⧆②③⑤
8. Commonwealth v. Yancy, 797 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. 2003) (finding that
the defense counsel’s failure to call the neuroradiologist who performed a
single photon emission computerized tomography scan on the defendant’s
brain and found a temporal lobe abnormality to testify about the effect of the
defendant’s organic brain defect and drug use on his ability to premeditate
did not render counsel ineffective because the neuroradiologist refused to
testify to any link between the defendant’s brain abnormality and his actions
in killing the victims and thus would not have aided the defense).
⧆②⑤
9. Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence of the defendant’s
mental illness, mental retardation, and troubled family background as
requested by the defendant).
⧆⑤⑦
10. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2012)
(discussing, but ultimately denying, the claim that defense counsel failed to
conduct a thorough investigation into the defendant’s abusive childhood, his
well-documented severe learning disability, and his medical and
psychological history indicating that the defendant suffered from emotional
handicap and an uncontrollable rage reaction or impulse disorder as a result
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of brain damage), vacated on reh’g en banc, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012),
trial court opinion aff’d on reh’g en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013).
⧆⑤⑦⑧
11. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the
prejudicial impact during the penalty phase of the trial of defense counsel’s
failure to present any medical testimony of the defendant’s drug intoxication
at the time of the murder or any testimony that the defendant suffered abuse,
neglect, and instability throughout his childhood and was diagnosed as
schizophrenic; further noting that even if available PET scan evidence could
establish that Jackson suffered some PCP-induced brain abnormality, the
effect of such abnormality on the defendant’s ability to premeditate, or form
a specific intent at the time of the shooting, was not demonstrated); see also
Jackson v. Calderon, CV 91-4249-R, 1997 WL 855516 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14,
1997).
⧆⨹②⑤⑦
12. Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding defense counsel
ineffective for failing to secure a mental health expert and seek neurological
testing, as the evidence indicated that the defendant had a traumatic
childhood fraught with mental and sexual abuse, brain injuries, multiple
psychological disorders, and drug addiction issues, all of which would have
impacted the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty), vacated, 563 U.S.
932 (2011).
⧆⨹②⑦
13. Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that the fact that
the defendant had once tried to commit suicide and was on psychotropic
medication does not mean he was incompetent or that the court was required
to order a competency evaluation; in addition, because the defendant did not
raise an insanity defense, the defense counsel could not be found deficient
for failing to call the doctor who diagnosed the defendant with
schizoaffective disorder as a witness).
⧆①⑥⑦
14. Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting on
procedural grounds the defendant’s claim of insufficient assistance of
counsel based on the failure to present mitigating evidence regarding the
defendant’s traumatic childhood and his history of drug abuse and mental
illness).
⧆②⑦
15. Odle v. Calderon, 919 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing the
plethora of mental health records and expert witnesses presented at trial to
explain how the severe brain trauma and temporal lobe lobectomy suffered
by the defendant following a car accident resulted in erratic behavior and
personality changes to support the court’s rejection of the defendant’s claim
of ineffective counsel), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Odle v. Woodford, 238
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2001).
⧆⑤
16. Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to argue the defense of mental incapacity
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during the guilt phase of trial, despite several experts opining that the
defendant suffered from an arteriovenous malformation rupture and alcohol
intoxication at the time of the murders because there was sufficient
premeditation and planning activity).
⧆⨹②⑤
17. People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153 (Cal. 1995) (explaining that
defendant’s history of severe sexual, physical, and emotional abuse and prior
psychological diagnoses of schizophrenia and disassociation did not support
an inference of organic brain damage that would warrant defense counsel to
seek neurological testing).
⧆⑤⑦
18. People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997) (analyzing how the
State’s expert witness rebutted the defense’s theory that the defendant
suffered from idiosyncratic intoxication, a form of psychomotor epilepsy, by
pointing to the defendant’s medical records, EEG results, and detailed
statement to police to negate the suggestion that the defendant suffered any
amnesia or history of brain trauma as required for said diagnosis).
⨹②⑤
19. People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1992) (affirming the death
sentence for the torture and murder of the defendant’s child, where experts
from both the defense and prosecution testified that the defendant was not
suffering from organic brain damage, amphetamine psychosis, or any other
disorder and opined that even a misguided attempt at child discipline can
involve an intent to cause cruel pain and suffering requisite for a first-degree
murder conviction).
⑦
20. People v. Musselwhite, 954 P.2d 475 (Cal. 1998) (noting that the
central feature of the defendant’s defense at trial was the claim that the
defendant suffered from an organic brain defect (supported by the brain
electrical activity mapping test) that, in conjunction with prolonged crack
cocaine abuse, rendered him incapable of the deliberation and premeditation
required to support a verdict of first-degree murder).
⧆②④⑤⑧
21. Pike v. State, No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2011) (affirming that counsel was not ineffective
for failing to present mitigating evidence that the defendant suffered from
brain damage; psychiatric disorders, including bipolar disorder and
borderline personality disorder; a heterotopia, which is associated with
mental retardation and epilepsy; and a history of severe substance abuse,
physical abuse, and sexual abuse).
⧆⑤⑦⑧
22. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (holding that counsel was
not ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence,
which included family members’ criminal, mental, and substance abuse
problems, and the defendant’s medical and mental health history, such as his
epileptic disorder).
⧆⑤⑦
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23. Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue an insanity defense or a
voluntary intoxication defense, despite expert testimony indicating that the
defendant had suffered from brain damage and a seizure disorder and may
have been too intoxicated to form the necessary intent to commit
premeditated murder).
⧆②④⑤⑥
24. Reynolds v. Bagley, 498 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the
psychologists retained by defense counsel sufficient under Strickland, where
one of the psychologists was inexperienced, did not perform a CT scan, and
only performed a five-minute neurological exam).
⧆②
25. Roberts v. Bowersox, 61 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (explaining
that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence regarding defendant’s crack
cocaine usage did not violate due process, where two mental health experts
and an EEG revealed that the defendant suffered from epileptiform and
frontal temporal abnormalities, because if the defendant’s brain abnormality
did not result in sufficient diminished capacity to negate the required mental
state, then voluntary intoxication, which aggravates the alleged
abnormalities, does not serve to negate the mental state either).
⧆②③④⑤
26. Samayoa v. Ayers, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (opining
that there was no prejudice, even if defense counsel was ineffective in failing
to present information about the defendant’s physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse, his extreme poverty, or his familial history of drug and alcohol abuse
to the mental health experts and to the jury as mitigation; that said, the court
issued a certificate of appealability on one claim related to ineffective
assistance of counsel because the court found that counsel’s performance was
likely deficient in preparing for and conducting the penalty phase of
petitioner’s trial), aff’d, 649 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2011); see also People v.
Samayoa, 938 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1997).
⧆⨹⑤⑦
27. Saranchak v. Beard, 616 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that trial
counsel’s failure to investigate and present an adequate diminished capacity
defense did not prejudice the defendant due to the overwhelming evidence of
the defendant’s specific intent to commit the murders, despite testimony that
the defendant suffered from auditory hallucinations, schizoaffective disorder,
delusion, pathological paranoia, and a tenuous ability to apprehend reality).
⧆②③④⑤
28. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (denying the defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure of counsel to investigate
additional mitigating evidence in light of the fact that the defendant had
expressly refused and repeatedly interrupted his counsel’s efforts to raise
mitigating evidence and understood the consequences of these actions).
⧆⑦
29. Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding a cause of
action where it was debatable whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate
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the psychological and biological impact of the defendant’s long and extensive
history of substance abuse was reasonable given the testimony that the
defendant had been on a weeklong crack cocaine binge preceding the murder
and could not remember committing the murder).
⧆⨹②
30. Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2002) (noting that testimony
from a forensic psychiatrist, one of the State’s expert witnesses, that the
defendant had antisocial personality traits, such as lack of remorse for others,
was of minor consequence and constituted harmless error and thus did not
warrant granting the defendant’s motion for mistrial).
⑤⑦
31. State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (finding the
State’s expert testimony—that the defendant was in the normal range of
intelligence, exhibited no pathological paranoia or delusional thinking, and
had no brain damage—to be more credible and persuasive than defense’s
directly opposing testimony in deeming the defendant competent to stand
trial).
④⑤
32. State v. Frogge, 607 S.E.2d 627 (N.C. 2005) (reinstating the
defendant’s death sentence on the grounds that an MRI of the defendant’s
brain revealed no anomalies and that, even if counsel had pursued mitigating
evidence of permanent residual effects of an earlier head injury at the time
the defendant committed the murders, he still would not be excused).
⧆②③⑤
33. Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing courtappointed psychiatric testimony that described the defendant as “functionally
mentally retarded,” with organic brain dysfunction, explosive personality
disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder
yet found the defendant competent to stand trial and legally sane under the
M’Naghten standard), opinion withdrawn, 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir.), reh’g en
banc granted, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
⧆①⑧
34. Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
defendant’s trial lawyer was not at fault for failing to search the defendant’s
prison and school records, which might have provided an alternative theory
of mitigation by revealing that the defendant was of below average
intelligence, emotionally disturbed, and suffering from schizoid tendencies
and a paranoid personality).
⧆⑦
35. Thompson v. Bell, 373 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
decision to exclude relevant psychological evidence that the defendant
suffered from organic brain damage and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
type, at the time of the offense and affirm the defendant’s death sentence was
based on procedural grounds), rev’d, 545 U.S. 794 (2005); see also
Thompson v. Bell, 315 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2003).
⧆⑥

2016]

DIFFERING USES OF NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE

479

36. United States v. Battle, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(discussing the district court’s finding that the defendant was competent to
stand trial and that despite the defendant’s IQ of eighty-six, he could
successfully fool an experienced psychiatrist regarding the genuineness of
his claimed delusion of having implants that harassed him and monitored his
thoughts); see also United States v. Battle, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Ga.
2003).
⧆⑤⑥
37. United States v. Davis, 611 F. Supp. 2d 472 (D. Md. 2009) (discussing
defense’s evidence of the defendant’s chaotic and violent home environment,
well-documented and consistent history of intellectual and adaptive
functioning deficits, and partial-complex seizure disorder, in finding the
defendant mentally retarded and thus ineligible for imposition of the death
penalty).
⨹①
38. White v. State, 973 P.2d 306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (reversing and
remanding a first-degree murder conviction and death penalty sentence on
the grounds that the lower court’s exclusion of defense’s mental health expert
testimony supporting the defendant’s claim that his voluntary intoxication
affected his mental state and prevented him from forming malice
aforethought was prejudicial and an abuse of discretion).
⧆⨹②
39. Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding that the
defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain a PET scan
of the defendant’s brain in order to strengthen his diminished capacity
defense because first, the use of PET scans to demonstrate any definite link
between the defendant’s brain abnormalities and his diagnosed personality
disorder was not generally accepted in the scientific community and, second,
even if the PET scan results did support the personality disorder diagnoses,
the defendant’s cognitive abilities were normal and there was overwhelming
evidence that the defendant acted with deliberation in committing the
murder).
⧆③⑤

